Russian ‘special military operation’ as a failed coup de main. An intelligence analysis perspective

The authors analyse the invasions and accompanying intelligence activities as coup de main operations, understood not as strict execution of the art of war, but rather as a coup d’état carried out by external forces on the territory of the attacked state. Coup de main as an effective surprise attack requires the use of offensive counterintelligence infiltration and the pacification of the opponent with police-type forces. In the article, these mechanisms are analysed using the example of Soviet actions in countries perceived by Moscow as its sphere of influence, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 historical experience from the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which the authors compare to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops in 1968. Understanding this model of aggression requires presenting instruments for analysing how the authoritarian state operates.

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Publication Details

Journal
Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego
Published
2025-08-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.25.015.22181
Primary Topic
Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Russian ‘special military operation’ as a failed coup de main. An intelligence analysis perspective

Michał Klasa, Marek Klasa
Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego
Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
article

Russian ‘special military operation’ as a failed coup de main. An intelligence analysis perspective

Michał Klasa, Marek Klasa
article en

Abstract

The authors analyse the invasions and accompanying intelligence activities as coup de main operations, understood not as strict execution of the art of war, but rather as a coup d’état carried out by external forces on the territory of the attacked state. Coup de main as an effective surprise attack requires the use of offensive counterintelligence infiltration and the pacification of the opponent with police-type forces. In the article, these mechanisms are analysed using the example of Soviet actions in countries perceived by Moscow as its sphere of influence, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 historical experience from the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which the authors compare to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops in 1968. Understanding this model of aggression requires presenting instruments for analysing how the authoritarian state operates.

Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego(32)
War Studies Academy (PL)
Openalex Percentile: Top 75%
Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
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Russian ‘special military operation’ as a failed coup de main. An intelligence analysis perspective — Michał Klasa, Marek Klasa · Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS