IsoFPGA- A Novel CMOS Galvanic Isolation Technique for Remote Physical Attacks in Multi-Tenant Cloud FPGA

Although FPGAs in cloud applications facilitate customized hardware acceleration, they also introduce new security challenges that demand attention. Granting cloud users, the capability to reconfigure hardware designs after deployment may create potential vulnerabilities for malicious users, thereby jeopardizing entire cloud platforms. Multitenant FPGA services, where a single FPGA is divided spatially among multiple users, are highly vulnerable to such attacks such as remote power side channel attacks, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and Fault Injection attacks. Security solutions are limited by the architectural design of existing FPGAs. We propose a novel power distribution network for cloud FPGA security using physical CMOS-based galvanic isolation. In this architecture, each tenant is isolated spatially, providing protection against voltage spikes, ground loops, and electrical noise, the key premises of remote physical attacks. The isolation technique is carried out by using reconfigurable MoM (Metal-over-Metal) capacitors and switch banks, along with Power Management and Configuration Controller Unit. By implementing a Custom Configuration Memory (CCM), we aim to provide a dynamic and customizable solution that allows FPGA designers to selectively interconnect or isolate groups of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs).

Publication Details

Published
2024-12-10
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/icfpt64416.2024.11113447
Primary Topic
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

IsoFPGA- A Novel CMOS Galvanic Isolation Technique for Remote Physical Attacks in Multi-Tenant Cloud FPGA

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
article

IsoFPGA- A Novel CMOS Galvanic Isolation Technique for Remote Physical Attacks in Multi-Tenant Cloud FPGA

article en

Abstract

Although FPGAs in cloud applications facilitate customized hardware acceleration, they also introduce new security challenges that demand attention. Granting cloud users, the capability to reconfigure hardware designs after deployment may create potential vulnerabilities for malicious users, thereby jeopardizing entire cloud platforms. Multitenant FPGA services, where a single FPGA is divided spatially among multiple users, are highly vulnerable to such attacks such as remote power side channel attacks, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and Fault Injection attacks. Security solutions are limited by the architectural design of existing FPGAs. We propose a novel power distribution network for cloud FPGA security using physical CMOS-based galvanic isolation. In this architecture, each tenant is isolated spatially, providing protection against voltage spikes, ground loops, and electrical noise, the key premises of remote physical attacks. The isolation technique is carried out by using reconfigurable MoM (Metal-over-Metal) capacitors and switch banks, along with Power Management and Configuration Controller Unit. By implementing a Custom Configuration Memory (CCM), we aim to provide a dynamic and customizable solution that allows FPGA designers to selectively interconnect or isolate groups of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs).

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Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
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IsoFPGA- A Novel CMOS Galvanic Isolation Technique for Remote Physical Attacks in Multi-Tenant Cloud FPGA · (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS