A Three-way Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Development of Traditional Automobile Enterprises under the Dual-carbon Background

Driven by the dual-carbon target, the collaborative innovation between traditional automobile enterprises and knowledge production institutions has become a key path to promote the green transformation of the industry. This paper builds a three-party evolutionary game model of the government, traditional automobile enterprises, and knowledge production institutions based on evolutionary game theory. By examining the strategic interactions and dynamic evolution laws of the three stakeholders, it reveals the evolutionary mechanism of collaborative innovation at various stages of development. The study shows that: in the initial stage of the industry, the government dominates the market through subsidies and penalties, but traditional automobile enterprises have high cooperation costs and insufficient short-term benefits, and knowledge production institutions have low participation due to the difficulty of technological transformation; with the continuous optimization of the policy and the maturity of the market, the three parties gradually form positive synergies, and the marginal effect of government subsidies and penalties is diminishing; and finally, in the maturity stage, the three parties and the knowledge production institutions have a positive synergy through the interaction and dynamic evolution law. Ultimately, in the mature stage, traditional automobile enterprises and knowledge production institutions realize autonomous cooperation through technology sharing and market mechanism, and the government can gradually withdraw from intervention. Sensitivity analysis shows that high penalties and moderate subsidies are the core levers to promote collaborative innovation, while high regulatory costs will weaken the government's ability to regulate.