INTEGRITY, COURAGE, SCEPTICISM
Does our inability to always self–attribute epistemic courage when we manifest it (a limited kind of reflective scepticism about epistemic courage) conflict with the virtue of integrity? I articulate this problem, and argue that it can be eschewed if we construe integrity along meliorist rather than perfectionist lines.
Authors
- Andrei Mărășoiu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9400-7702)
Institutions
- University of Bucharest (RO)
Publication Details
- Journal
- The Annals of the University of Bucharest Philosophy Series
- Published
- 2025-08-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.62229/aubpslxxiii/2_24/2
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Universitatea din București