Washout-Filter Power-Sharing-Based Resilient Control Strategy for Microgrids Against False Data Injection Attacks

Secondary control (SC) under false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in microgrids can compromise control decisions and disrupt the normal operation of the system. This paper proposes a washout-filter power-sharing-based resilient control strategy to tackle FDIAs. This strategy ensures the primary control continues to function normally by enabling the timely disconnection of the attacked SC. To address the under-rated operation state caused by the loss of SC, washout-filter power sharing is activated to restore the rated operation. Furthermore, for the FDIAs that affect both system frequency and voltage simultaneously after power sharing, a voltage compensation control loop is designed for the local voltage drop, allowing the attacked voltage value to further recover to the rated value. This strategy secures a steady frequency and enhanced voltage amplitude in the system, achieving a resilient effect against FDIAs. The proposed strategy has been validated through various simulation scenarios and FPGA-in-the-loop experiments.