Moral Gatekeeping

In our lives we regularly give and rely on testimony about other’s moral characters. We might, for example, chat about a visitor’s kindness, or commiserate with friends by admonishing a deceitful politician. In this essay, I provide an account of this social practice which I call moral gatekeeping. The analogy of a gatekeeper highlights how we both bar others from and invite them into the moral community when we gatekeep. I define moral gatekeeping as follows: Communication to at least one member of the moral community of a reason—or reasons—to reconsider or reaffirm their view of the moral character of an individual, group of individuals, or social group, in the moral community. Moral gatekeeping has three fundamental components: a shared reason, a recipient, and a gatekeeper. After describing them, I defend moral gatekeeping against the concern that it stymies moral progress by: (1) highlighting gatekeeping’s intrinsic and instrumental moral value, and (2) arguing that abandoning gatekeeping entails abandoning forgiveness. Moral gatekeeping is a fundamental social practice that cannot be rejected; its ethic concerns not whether, but when and how we gatekeep. I conclude with a brief discussion of when and how we should gatekeep.