Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Intangible Cultural Heritage Skills Protection: An Interactive Framework Among Enterprises, Governments, and Preservation Associations

This study addresses the multi-agent coordination challenges in intangible cultural heritage (ICH) protection by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving tea enterprises, governments, and ICH preservation associations. Through dynamic replication equations and stability analysis of Jacobian matrices, we systematically examine the strategic interactions in the transmission of ICH skills. Six typical scenarios were simulated via MATLAB numerical simulations, including market failure, government-led strict regulation, association-led supervision, government-association collaboration, spontaneous enterprise-led transmission, and association-supported spontaneous transmission. Key findings reveal the following: (1) market competitiveness of traditional crafts serves as the foundation for spontaneous transmission—higher premium values enable intervention-free preservation; (2) government regulatory effectiveness exhibits a strict threshold—reliance solely on penalty policies may lead to “regulatory inefficacy”; and (3) preservation associations can compensate for governmental gaps through reputation mechanisms, but this requires sustained funding.