The Deontic Wager

Abstract Recently, a number of philosophers have put forward wager arguments to the conclusion that, as moral agents, we should act as if we have free will. These arguments have a similar structure: they argue that if we act as though free will does not exist and it actually does, we incur significant moral costs. Conversely, if we act as if free will exists when it does not, we face no comparable moral costs. Such arguments face two significant objections: The Objection from Rank -Ordering and The Objection from Probability . None of the existing wagers adequately address these objections without incurring serious theoretical costs. In this paper, I propose a new wager argument, the Deontic Wager , which is better positioned to meet them. Briefly, the argument is as follows: if we lack free will, acting as if it exists doesn’t violate any of our obligations towards others. However, if we do have free will and fail to acknowledge it, we will violate some of our obligations towards others. Therefore, it is rational to act as if free will exists. I demonstrate how The Deontic Wager is less vulnerable to The Objection from Rank-Ordering and The Objection from Probability than the other wagers, and explain its potential applications in moral philosophy.