Symbolic Parallel Composition for Multi-language Protocol Verification
The implementation of security protocols often combines different languages. This practice, however, poses a challenge to traditional verification techniques, which typically assume a single-language environment and, therefore, are in-sufficient to handle challenges presented by the interplay of different languages. To address this issue, we establish principles for combining multiple programming languages operating on different atomic types using a symbolic execution semantics. This facilitates the (parallel) composition of labeled transition systems, improving the analysis of complex systems by streamlining communication between diverse programming languages. By treating the Dolev-Yao (DY) model as a symbolic abstraction, our approach eliminates the need for translation between different base types, such as bitstrings and DY terms. Our technique provides a foundation for securing interactions in multi-language environments, enhancing program verification and system analysis in complex, interconnected systems.
Authors
- Robert Künnemann (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0822-9283)
- Hamed Nemati (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9251-3679)
- Faezeh Nasrabadi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-3659-7755)
Institutions
- Helmholtz Center for Information Security (DE)
- KTH Royal Institute of Technology (SE)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-06-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/csf64896.2025.00030
- Primary Topic
- Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00