In the Silence of the Heart: Wittgenstein and the “Inner”

Wittgenstein’s philosophy has influenced the philosophy of religion quite considerably. This is hardly due to his rather few remarks on religion. Instead, Wittgenstein’s influence seems to be connected to a certain, without doubt common, interpretation of his later philosophy, mainly of Philosophical Investigations. I speak about one interpretation because in my view the purportedly different interpretations of the sense in which certain key-concepts in the Philosophical Investigations are supposed to be fruitful for understanding religious language, in fact have a common, unacknowledged presupposition: that Wittgenstein’s account of language rotates around the quite traditional, philosophical concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. In the interpretations at stake, these concepts form the backdrop of questions about what “can” intelligibly be assessed by an individual and what “has to be” accounted for in “our” common language. There are discussions in the Philosophical Investigations that do give rise to such questions. However, what I take to be the main direction in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is the movement away from the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. Most clearly, this is visible in the second volume of Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, where Wittgenstein dissolves the idea of the inscrutable inner of the other. As I will show, these remarks are in tension both with the views that his followers, such as Peter Winch, put forth and with his own remarks on religion in Culture and Value.