Dilemma and Optimization Path of the World Trade Organization Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanism

The paralysis of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) has become a systemic crisis for the multilateral trading system. This paper uses literature review and case analysis to analyze the issue. It concludes that while the 2019 suspension of the Appellate Body was directly caused by US obstruction of appointments, its deeper roots lie in the conflict between the mechanism's inherent flaws and the restructuring of global economic power. Firstly, procedural delays result in an average case processing time far exceeding the 90-day limit stipulated in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). Secondly, the AB has had to deal with the issue of 'overreach in rulings,' including encroaching on the mandates of other WTO bodies and exceeding its authority in reviewing factual issues. Thirdly, the mechanism struggles to reconcile the shifting balance between unilateralism and multilateralism. To address the DSM's predicament, this paper proposes a dual-track optimization path: in the short term, establishing a "Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement" (MPIA) in accordance with Article 25 of the DSU as a temporary substitute for the paralyzed AB; and in the long term, undertaking systemic restructuring of the mechanism. This includes introducing qualified majority voting to break the deadlock in judgement appointments, reasonably extending time limits to suitcase complexity, and drawing on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) model to curb judicial overreach. B The paper aims to analyze the viability of this optimization path as an interim solution.