Information Game in Transboundary River Pollution Governance: A Comparative Study of the Mekong River and U.S.-Mexico Border Rivers

Information asymmetry and strategic gaming among nations severely impact transboundary river pollution governance. This study examines the Mekong River Basin and U.S.-Mexico border rivers as representative cases, employing an information economics lens to dissect the gaming logic in transnational water governance. Findings revealed that disputes over asymmetric monitoring capacities between upstream and downstream nations in the Mekong Basin exacerbate accountability evasion and ecological compensation deadlocks. Conversely, the U.S.-Mexico case demonstrates that third-party verification mechanisms under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) partially mitigate information manipulation risks. This research introduces a "technology-institutional synergy" governance paradigm, leveraging the integration of satellite remote sensing and blockchain technology to create immutable pollution evidence chains. It also promotes legally binding information disclosure frameworks within the context of international law. The findings offer insights for ecological governance along the Belt and Road Initiative, emphasizing equitable data sharing and institutional innovation.