Uncertainty, Doubt, and Faith: A Kierkegaardian Model of Authenticity

Abstract In this paper, I draw upon recent commentary on Kierkegaard’s existential religious philosophy in order to clarify some key aspects of the idea of authenticity. Interpretations of Kierkegaard’s work in this area highlight the importance of truth considered subjectively rather than objectively, while emphasising the critical role of faith in understanding the truth for an individual subject. However, there remains some dispute about the importance of the objective referent in subjective truth claims and affirmations of faith. Considering how objective uncertainty forms an integral part of faith for Kierkegaard, I argue against the importance of an objective referent for subjective truth, as relations of faith hold despite– and indeed, partly because of– their underlying objective uncertainty. The objective truth of one’s subjective truth claims is, in other words, not a necessary criterion for truth as subjectivity for Kierkegaard. From this, I draw a connection to the centrality of genuine doubt in the pragmatist philosophy of Charles Peirce, in order to construct and defend a model of authenticity that emphasises a receptiveness to genuine doubt at its core.