Preventing Radio Fingerprinting through Low-Power Jamming

Radio Frequency fingerprinting enables a passive receiver to recognize and authenticate a transmitter without the need for cryptographic tools. Authentication is achieved by isolating specific features of the transmitted signal that are unique to the transmitter's hardware. Much research has focused on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of radio frequency fingerprinting to maximize its performance in various scenarios and conditions, while little research examined how to protect devices from being subject to radio fingerprinting in the wild. In this paper, we explore a novel point of view. We examine the threat posed by radio frequency fingerprinting, which facilitates the unauthorized identification of wireless devices in the field by malicious entities. We also suggest a method to sanitize the transmitted signal of its fingerprint using a low-power jammer, deployed on purpose to improve devices' anonymity on the channel while still guaranteeing the link's quality of service. Our experimental results and subsequent analysis demonstrate that a low-power jammer can effectively block a malicious eavesdropper from identifying a device without affecting the quality of the wireless link, thereby restoring the privacy of the user when accessing the radio spectrum.

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Publication Details

Published
2025-08-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3708821.3733862
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Wireless Signal Modulation Classification
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.96

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article

Preventing Radio Fingerprinting through Low-Power Jamming

Muhammad Irfan, Gabriele Oligeri, Savio Sciancalepore
2 citations
Wireless Signal Modulation Classification
4.96
article

Preventing Radio Fingerprinting through Low-Power Jamming

Muhammad Irfan, Gabriele Oligeri, Savio Sciancalepore
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Radio Frequency fingerprinting enables a passive receiver to recognize and authenticate a transmitter without the need for cryptographic tools. Authentication is achieved by isolating specific features of the transmitted signal that are unique to the transmitter's hardware. Much research has focused on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of radio frequency fingerprinting to maximize its performance in various scenarios and conditions, while little research examined how to protect devices from being subject to radio fingerprinting in the wild. In this paper, we explore a novel point of view. We examine the threat posed by radio frequency fingerprinting, which facilitates the unauthorized identification of wireless devices in the field by malicious entities. We also suggest a method to sanitize the transmitted signal of its fingerprint using a low-power jammer, deployed on purpose to improve devices' anonymity on the channel while still guaranteeing the link's quality of service. Our experimental results and subsequent analysis demonstrate that a low-power jammer can effectively block a malicious eavesdropper from identifying a device without affecting the quality of the wireless link, thereby restoring the privacy of the user when accessing the radio spectrum.

Hamad bin Khalifa University (QA), Eindhoven University of Technology (NL)
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
Affordable and clean energy
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Wireless Signal Modulation Classification
4.96
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Preventing Radio Fingerprinting through Low-Power Jamming — Muhammad Irfan, Gabriele Oligeri, et al. · (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS