Uncertainty and Miscalculation in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Role of Bureaucratic Structures

Abstract Drawing on Tyler Jost’s Bureaucracies at War: The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation, this review article engages with the book’s themes and examines the institutional causes of failures in international crises. It first outlines Jost’s core argument, that variation in national security institutional design explains why leaders misjudge the likely costs and outcomes of conflict more than regime type or leader personality. It then situates Jost’s theory within broader literatures on misperception, cognitive bias, and organizational behavior, and reflects on key assumptions about bureaucratic competence, the reliability of intelligence, and the clarity of information to explore how even accurate information can be distorted by individual and institutional filters. The review also considers additional pathways to miscalculation beyond those explored in the book and examines the policy implications of Jost’s framework for alliance durability, the behavior of authoritarian states like China, and the risks posed by fragmented institutions in democratic nations. Jost’s work is an important contribution to the study of foreign policy decision-making, and this article raises further questions about the limits of institutional design in a world shaped by uncertainty and political self-preservation.