The detection of malicious control command attacks on transformer tap changers
Abstract With the promotion of photovoltaic (PV) power generation technology, the distribution grid faces challenges in voltage control, especially with the voltage fluctuations caused by the high penetration of PV systems. Existing control methods achieve automation through Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), but smart grids are vulnerable to False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) and malicious control command threats. This paper proposes an attack detection algorithm based on the phase angle derived from the ratio of branch current to terminal voltage, which effectively identifies attack behaviors.
Authors
- Yulin Zhou (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4241-0214)
- Defeng Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0138-2149)
- Hongbi Geng
- Shuai Ren (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8149-8602)
- Ruitong Liu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2361-2993)
- Feng Jie Sun (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4554-3805)
- Minghao Sun (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5658-7806)
- Tong Li (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7522-3176)
- Gang Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8320-6594)
- Chao Yang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8774-8115)
- Jian Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3323-7560)
- Zhibin Yang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0243-6612)
- Shujun Yang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5419-4416)
Institutions
- Electric Power Research Institute (US)
- North China Electric Power University (CN)
- Shanghai Electric (China) (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Physics Conference Series
- Published
- 2025-08-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/3079/1/012009
- Primary Topic
- Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00