The Exit Threats of Non-Controlling Large Shareholders and Maturity Mismatch: Evidence from China

Maturity mismatch between investment and financing is a major potential risk faced by firms in recent years, which also concerns the controllability of macroeconomic movement risk and the quality and efficiency of economic development. This study explores the mitigation measures of maturity mismatch from the important governance mechanism of Non-controlling Large Shareholders (NCLSs) exit threats. Taking Chinese listed companies on the A-share market over the period 2010 to 2020 as a sample, we find that the exit threats of NCLSs significantly alleviate the degree of maturity mismatch. Furthermore, we investigate the moderating role of the attention of market parties (analyst, media, and investor) on the above relationship. We find that the higher the attention of market parties, the more significant the inhibitory role of NCLSs exit threats on the maturity mismatch. Based on the above research results, we propose countermeasures and suggestions for firms to construct a reasonable ownership structure for NCLSs to engage in corporate governance flexibly and effectively.