<i>Errata</i> for Dahlman &amp; Kolflaath ‘Presumed prior, contextual prior, and bizarre consequences—a reply to Ronald Meester and Lonneke Stevens’, <i>Law, Probability and Risk</i>, 2024

There are two calculations on p. 5 that show how a prior probability that treats some possible perpetrators as impossible, combined with likelihoods that take the disregarded perpetrators into consideration, leads to a posterior probability that exceeds 100%.In the first example (p. 5, first paragraph), the posterior probability becomes 106%.In the second example (p. 5, second paragraph), it amounts to 127%.Unfortunately, there is an error in the first calculation, due to the fact that 8500 has been rounded up to 9000 on the previous page (p.4).If this is corrected, the calculation no longer holds and does not show how a prior that disregards possible perpetrators leads to a posterior that exceeds 100%.The second calculation (where the posterior becomes 127%) is, nevertheless, entirely correct.Readers are, therefore, kindly asked to disregard the first calculation and only take the second calculation as an illustration of the point that is being made.

Publication Details

Journal
Law Probability and Risk
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/lpr/mgaf006
Primary Topic
Probability and Risk Models
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Errata for Dahlman & Kolflaath ‘Presumed prior, contextual prior, and bizarre consequences—a reply to Ronald Meester and Lonneke Stevens’, Law, Probability and Risk, 2024

Law Probability and Risk
Probability and Risk Models
article

Errata for Dahlman & Kolflaath ‘Presumed prior, contextual prior, and bizarre consequences—a reply to Ronald Meester and Lonneke Stevens’, Law, Probability and Risk, 2024

article en

Abstract

There are two calculations on p. 5 that show how a prior probability that treats some possible perpetrators as impossible, combined with likelihoods that take the disregarded perpetrators into consideration, leads to a posterior probability that exceeds 100%.In the first example (p. 5, first paragraph), the posterior probability becomes 106%.In the second example (p. 5, second paragraph), it amounts to 127%.Unfortunately, there is an error in the first calculation, due to the fact that 8500 has been rounded up to 9000 on the previous page (p.4).If this is corrected, the calculation no longer holds and does not show how a prior that disregards possible perpetrators leads to a posterior that exceeds 100%.The second calculation (where the posterior becomes 127%) is, nevertheless, entirely correct.Readers are, therefore, kindly asked to disregard the first calculation and only take the second calculation as an illustration of the point that is being made.

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<i>Errata</i> for Dahlman &amp; Kolflaath ‘Presumed prior, contextual prior, and bizarre consequences—a reply to Ronald Meester and Lonneke Stevens’, <i>Law, Probability and Risk</i>, 2024 · Law Probability and Risk (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS