Coercive environmentalism and political legitimacy in the age of climate change: the case of fisheries in Uganda

• Examines the legitimacy implications of coercive environmental governance through a case study of militarized fisheries enforcement in Uganda. • Finds that while coercive policies improve fisheries protection, they undermine political legitimacy by increasing social conflict and economic inequalities. • Demonstrates that environmental success does not necessarily translate into public support for the government or its policies. • Explores how marginalized fishers resist coercive policies through informal collective actions, deepening intra-community tensions. • Argues that for long-term sustainability, coercive environmentalism must eventually transition to participatory governance. One would expect the growing environmental validation of coercion to jolt scholars out of the ’dogmatic slumber’ in which the preeminence of participatory procedures and inalienable rights is often taken for granted. Yet, as climate change is increasingly invoked to justify coercive environmentalism, the political consequences of this emerging paradigm remain underexamined. The perceived effectiveness of authoritarian regimes, such as China, in addressing ecological crises is contributing to a shift from participatory to coercive approaches. This trend not only raises the risk of democratic backsliding but also poses concerns about implications for political legitimacy. This paper examines the relationship between coercive governance, environmental crisis management, and political legitimacy. It uses field surveys and interviews to assess how the 2015 deployment of soldiers to enforce fisheries regulations influences support for regime institutions and evaluations of regime performance. The findings show that the militarized policy undermines legitimacy, as indicated by both the widespread opposition it generates and the negative assessments of government, stemming from heightened social inequalities—within and between communities—and reduced community involvement in fisheries management. Additionally, while many participants perceive improved fisheries protection, this does not equate to enhanced legitimacy, as these perceptions do not translate into support for the policy or the government overall. Instead, increased conflict—both between fishers and soldiers, and among the fishers themselves—along with reports of heightened personal insecurity, further suggests that the policy undermines legitimacy. This evidence of failure to secure widespread legitimacy implies that, for long-term sustainability, coercive measures must eventually give way to strategies that foster communal ownership and active participation.