Smokescreens of digital markets—choice manipulation and the illusion of consent

The near impossibility of consent in digital spheres is discussed, considering factors such as information asymmetries, behavioural economics, and choice architecture. The DMA, specifically Article 5(2), attempts to remedy this problem, but as it still relies upon the GDPR standard of consent, it is not fully effective, exemplified by Meta's loopholes via its subscription service. As an effective solution using the GDPR standard of consent, a pre-designed choice screen could be imposed, with minimal options for accepting data processing activities such as 'Accept All' or 'Accept Only Essential'. Under the DMA, a new, stricter standard of consent could be considered with the consent factors in mind involving automatically using the minimal data processing settings, with a pre-designed choice screen shown to consumers with the options of 'Accept' or 'Change Settings', providing the choice to include more data-processing activities.