Timing selection of enterprise' green R&D under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism: From the perspective of technological spillover

Against the backdrop of the government's carbon reduction policies and the growing environmental awareness of consumers, enterprises are increasingly investing in green research and development (R&D). However, green technologies are prone to spill over through various channels, making it difficult for technology-holding enterprises to maintain their competitive edge. Therefore, the choice of R&D timing is of great significance for the production and operation of enterprises. To this end, this paper constructs a duopoly game model, assuming that when enterprises conduct R&D at different stages, a technology spillover effect will occur. However, enterprises can also choose to cooperate. The later R&D enterprise only needs to pay a fixed licensing fee to the technology-holding enterprise to obtain the same green technology. The following conclusions are drawn through research: Firstly, when enterprises choose to cooperate, it can not only enhance economic benefits but also contribute to carbon emission reduction. Secondly, whether enterprises choose to cooperate will affect their optimal R&D timing. Specifically, if they do not cooperate, enterprises should seize the opportunity and take the lead in R&D; while if they choose to cooperate, they should carry out R&D at different time stages. Finally, as the emission reduction rate and carbon price increase, the gap in terms of both revenue and emission reduction volume between the earlier R&D enterprise and the later R&D enterprise will continue to widen, but the technology spillover effect can narrow this gap to a certain extent.