Anticomonotonicity for preference axioms: The natural counterpart to comonotonicity

Comonotonicity (same variation) of random variables minimizes hedging possibilities and has been widely used, e.g., in Gilboa and Schmeidler's ambiguity models. This paper investigates anticomonotonicity (opposite variation (AC)), the natural counterpart to comonotonicity. It minimizes leveraging rather than hedging possibilities. Surprisingly, AC restrictions of several traditional axioms do not give new models. Instead, they strengthen the foundations of existing classical models: (a) linear functionals through Cauchy's equation; (b) Anscombe–Aumann expected utility; (c) as‐if risk‐neutral pricing through no‐arbitrage; (d) de Finetti's bookmaking foundation of Bayesianism using subjective probabilities; (e) risk aversion in Savage's subjective expected utility. In each case, our generalizations show where the critical tests of classical axioms lie, i.e., in the AC cases (maximal hedges). We next present examples where AC restrictions do essentially weaken existing axioms, and do provide new properties and new models.

Publication Details

Journal
Theoretical Economics
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3982/te5799
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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Anticomonotonicity for preference axioms: The natural counterpart to comonotonicity

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Theoretical Economics
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
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Anticomonotonicity for preference axioms: The natural counterpart to comonotonicity

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Abstract

Comonotonicity (same variation) of random variables minimizes hedging possibilities and has been widely used, e.g., in Gilboa and Schmeidler's ambiguity models. This paper investigates anticomonotonicity (opposite variation (AC)), the natural counterpart to comonotonicity. It minimizes leveraging rather than hedging possibilities. Surprisingly, AC restrictions of several traditional axioms do not give new models. Instead, they strengthen the foundations of existing classical models: (a) linear functionals through Cauchy's equation; (b) Anscombe–Aumann expected utility; (c) as‐if risk‐neutral pricing through no‐arbitrage; (d) de Finetti's bookmaking foundation of Bayesianism using subjective probabilities; (e) risk aversion in Savage's subjective expected utility. In each case, our generalizations show where the critical tests of classical axioms lie, i.e., in the AC cases (maximal hedges). We next present examples where AC restrictions do essentially weaken existing axioms, and do provide new properties and new models.

Theoretical EconomicsVol. 20(3)
Canada Research Chairs, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
Openalex Percentile: Top 75%
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
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Anticomonotonicity for preference axioms: The natural counterpart to comonotonicity · Theoretical Economics (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS