Are Phenomenal Properties Determinables of Physical Determinates? A Response to Wilson

Abstract What is the relation between the phenomenal properties of experience and physical properties, such as physical properties of the brain? I evaluate the proposal that phenomenal properties are determinables of physical realizer determinates , focusing Jessica Wilson’s response to a prominent argument for thinking that phenomenal properties cannot be understood in this way. Wilson premises her response on the idea that phenomenal properties admit of physical determination dimensions, which can be discovered through the relevant sciences. I provide several reasons for questioning this way of understanding the relation between the phenomenal and the physical, centered on the idea that even if phenomenal properties have physical determination dimensions, it remains to be shown that these determine the physical realizers of phenomenal properties, and provide reasons for denying that this is the case. I then address Wilson’s “powers-based conception” of the determinable/determinate relation and argue that it faces difficulties both independent from and in relation to the view of phenomenal properties as determinables of physical realizer determinates.