Sticky-PRE: A Sticky Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol for Persistent Vehicle Data Privacy
Connected vehicles generate a vast amount of data and share it with external entities such as the cloud, neighboring vehicles, Road-Side Units (RSUs), and other third-party services in a Vehicle to Everything (V2X) setting. This data is vulnerable and can lead to the leakage of personal information of vehicle owners, such as driving habits, travel routes, and identity theft, among others. Moreover, with the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), it becomes imperative to empower users with control over their data and the ability to choose whom they share it with. To address this objective, we present a protocol that utilizes a combination of sticky policies and a proxy re-encryption scheme. This protocol ensures that user-defined access controls on the data persist even when crossing organizational boundaries and addresses the confidentiality, integrity, and accountability of vehicle data. Furthermore, we assess our protocol using a semi-honest threat model and analyze its vulnerabilities. Lastly, we perform a quantitative analysis of the data flow model to observe the system's performance.
Authors
- Harald Kosch (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7090-1133)
- Ashish Ashutosh
- Omar Hasan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9585-7810)
- Lionel Brunie
- Pratik Baishnav
Institutions
- University of Passau (DE)
- Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Lyon (FR)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-06-22
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/iv64158.2025.11097565
- Primary Topic
- Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00