A disenchantment of legal concepts

The argument presented in the paper revolves around the question of the existence of legal concepts. It is widely assumed that concepts are essential in reasoning in general, and legal reasoning in particular. Meanwhile, it is surprisingly difficult to grasp and explain the nature and structure of concepts. There are several, often incompatible, theories of concepts. From this perspective, it is reasonable to ask whether concepts are indeed so instrumental in legal thinking. In this context, much insight may be gained by analysing recent advancements in the cognitive sciences, especially within the so-called embodied mind paradigm. Against this background I argue that while one is entitled to speak of the existence of concepts, they would gain more understanding and solve pressing problems when ignoring legal concepts (whatever they are taken to be) and instead concentrating on constructing, revising, comparing and applying theories. I further claim that — despite appearances — working with theories is exactly what legal scholars do.