When Less Is More: A Defense of Narrow, Humean Justice

Abstract The narrow conception of justice traditionally attributed to Hume limits itself to respect for the rules of property. This article challenges the increasingly common idea that this view is exceedingly narrow and unsatisfactory. We address this “Humean Problem of Justice” ( hpj ) in three steps. First, we consider a recent argument that Hume’s theory is, in fact, broader than usually acknowledged. In doing so, we identify four conceptions of justice that appear in Hume’s political writings. Despite the polysemy, we show that the narrow conception is, indeed, Hume’s core conception on plausible textual grounds. Second, we identify the philosophical reasons, internal to Hume’s political theory, that explain Hume’s preference for the narrow conception. Finally, we find that these philosophical reasons demonstrate the continued importance of Hume’s narrow conception of justice. Hume’s approach, we argue, merits reconsideration due to its surprising relevance to a society characterized by dynamism and diversity.