A Theory of Imposition

Abstract It is a commonplace that sometimes our behavior imposes on others and that this is worth avoiding. However, just how we impose and why it might matter have not been much studied. Philosophers have started to rectify this. Matti Häyry and Amanda Sukenick address imposition as part of a defense of antinatalism (2023). More extensively, Fiona Woollard provides an account of imposition and contends that it is the foundation for the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, according to which doing harm is more difficult to justify than allowing it (2015). The present project offers a theory of imposition, composed of an account of its nature and an explanation of why it is significant. I argue that the extant work on imposition has operated with inadequate understandings of its nature. While the antinatalist argument of Häyry and Sukenick can be preserved when combined with an adequate view of imposition, Woollard’s case for dda must be abandoned.