The Burdensomeness of Moral Metaethical Constitutivism

Abstract Moral metaethical constitutivists claim that moral reasons can be reduced to the constitutive aims or principles of agency. While such a project promises to secure the universality and conclusiveness of moral reasons, it also threatens to leave insufficient space for acting on other values. In this paper, I argue that moral metaethical constitutivism is unlikely to overcome the burdensomeness objection, according to which a theory is objectionably burdensome if it leaves insufficient space for the agent’s own projects, relationships, and so on. I argue that neither Christine Korsgaard’s reflective endorsement account nor Michael Smith’s capacities account can overcome the objection, and suggest that the problems that they encounter are likely to generalize to any moral metaethical constitutivism. It is unlikely that what is constitutive of agency is sensitive to the unique goods of humanity, and thus unlikely that good moral agents could also live good human lives.