Operational Decisions in Green Supply Chain Competition under Different Power Structures: Research on Pricing Strategies and Green Investment

产品绿色水平在减少碳排放方面发挥着至关重要的作用，帮助公司降低碳相关成本，同时增强市场竞争力。本文考虑两条关于价格竞争的绿色供应链，供应链1是供应商和零售商组成的分散式供应链，供应链2是将供应商和零售商整合的集中式供应链，其中制造商决定产品的批发价格和绿色水平，而零售商决定零售价格。利用博弈论方法，求解供应链成员在垂直纳什(VN)、制造商主导的Stackelberg (MS)和零售商主导的Stackelberg (RS)情形下的最优定价决策与绿色投入决策。总体结果通过三个命题和九个推论来呈现。此外，还进行了数值模拟，以进一步了解最优决策关于竞争对手价格、绿色水平和绿色投入的灵敏度。整体研究可以帮助企业掌握最优定价和绿色投入策略。Green product level plays a crucial role in reducing carbon emissions, helping companies lower carbon-related costs while enhancing market competitiveness. This study considers two green supply chains engaged in price competition. Supply Chain 1 is a decentralized chain comprising a supplier and a retailer. Supply Chain 2 is an integrated chain where the supplier and retailer are consolidated, with the manufacturer determining the product’s wholesale price and green level, while the retailer sets the retail price. Utilizing game-theoretic approaches, the optimal pricing and green investment decisions for supply chain members are derived under three power structures: Vertical Nash (VN), Manufacturer-led Stackelberg (MS), and Retailer-led Stackelberg (RS). The overall findings are presented through three propositions and nine corollaries. Furthermore, numerical simulations are conducted to provide deeper insights into the sensitivity of the optimal decisions concerning competitor pricing, green level, and green investment. Collectively, this research provides valuable guidance for enterprises seeking to master optimal pricing and green investment strategies.