India’s Ballistic Missile Defence Program in a Shifting Strategic Landscape

India's Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program represents a crucial strategic initiative aimed at countering missile threats from regional adversaries, particularly China and Pakistan. This paper evaluates the necessity and effectiveness of India's missile defense systems, assessing whether the program is a strategic imperative or an overinvestment. With the advancements in Phase-II of India's BMD, including the AD-1 and AD-2 interceptors capable of neutralizing intermediaterange ballistic missiles (IRBMs), the system's efficacy against China’s growing missile arsenal such as the DF-21 and DF-26 remains a focal point. India’s BMD program, currently in its developmental stage, has demonstrated limited operational capability, with successful interceptor tests but lacking in the full scale deployment. Critical areas for improvement includes sensor network integration, rapid target discrimination, and a multi-layered interception framework to counter evolving threats, including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs). A comparative analysis with Israel’s Iron Dome and the U.S.'s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system reveals significant gaps in India's BMD coverage. While Iron Dome excels in short-range missile interception and THAAD provides high-altitude defense against long-range threats, India's system remains fragmented. Lessons from these programs emphasize the need for an integrated air defense network, real-time threat assessment, and interoperability with allied defense systems. This study concludes that while India's BMD is strategically necessary, its current limitations necessitate further technological advancements and investment in network-centric warfare capabilities to ensure credible deterrence and defense.