Modeling the Evolutionary Mechanism of Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making in the Green Renovation of Existing Residential Buildings in China

The green renovation of existing residential buildings is a key way for the construction industry to achieve sustainable development and the dual carbon goals of China, which makes it urgent to make collaborative decisions among multiple stakeholders. However, because of divergent interests and risk perceptions among governments, energy service companies (ESCOs), and owners, the implementation of green renovation is hindered by numerous obstacles. In this study, we integrated prospect theory and evolutionary game theory by incorporating core prospect-theory parameters such as loss aversion and perceived value sensitivity, and developed a psychologically informed tripartite evolutionary game model. The objective was to provide a theoretical foundation and analytical framework for collaborative governance among stakeholders. Numerical simulations were conducted to validate the model’s effectiveness and explore how government regulation intensity, subsidy policies, market competition, and individual psychological factors influence the system’s evolutionary dynamics. The findings indicate that (1) government regulation and subsidy policies play central guiding roles in the early stages of green renovation, but the effectiveness has clear limitations; (2) ESCOs are most sensitive to policy incentives and market competition, and moderately increasing their risk costs can effectively deter opportunistic behavior associated with low-quality renovation; (3) owners’ willingness to participate is primarily influenced by expected returns and perceived renovation risks, while economic incentives alone have limited impact; and (4) the evolutionary outcomes are highly sensitive to parameters from prospect theory, The system’s evolutionary outcomes are highly sensitive to prospect theory parameters. High levels of loss aversion (λ) and loss sensitivity (β) tend to drive the system into a suboptimal equilibrium characterized by insufficient demand, while high gain sensitivity (α) serves as a key driving force for the system’s evolution toward the ideal equilibrium. This study offers theoretical support for optimizing green renovation policies for existing residential buildings in China and provides practical recommendations for improving market competition mechanisms, thereby promoting the healthy development of the green renovation market.