Protocol-Based PID Control of Switched Systems With DoS Attacks

This paper investigates the asynchronous PID control problem of switched systems under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and proposes a collaborative framework combining a resilient adaptive event-triggering protocol (RAETP) and robust model predictive control (RMPC). In response to the limitations of the traditional Bernoulli-type DoS attack model, a variable-frequency DoS attack model is innovatively introduced, which describes the dynamic uncertainty of the attack frequency through a random variable, thereby enhancing the ability to characterize real-world network threats. Based on the switching mechanism of piecewise homogeneous sojourn probabilities, an asynchronous PID-RMPC controller is designed, which uses time-varying mode estimation probabilities to compensate for the mode mismatch caused by attacks, and the mean square stability conditions of the closed-loop system are rigorously derived. Simulation experiments show that the proposed RAETP can increase the effective data transmission rate under attacks compared with the static event-triggered (SETP) protocol, and the PID-RMPC strategy has achieved rapid convergence and robust stability in two simulation examples, verifying the engineering applicability of the theoretical method.