Attack-Resilient and Privacy-Preserving Distributed Secondary Control of Cyber-Physical Microgrids

The distributed secondary control protocol plays a crucial role in regulating frequency, voltage, and the sharing of active and reactive power in an AC cyber-physical microgrid (CPMG). The challenges of network attacks, such as false data injection (FDI) attacks and eavesdropping, are considered together for an AC CPMG, and an auxiliary network-based attackresilient and privacy-preserving distributed secondary control protocol is proposed. Initially, the interactive dynamics between the original network and the auxiliary network are established. With the novel network dynamics, the information exchanged between distributed generators (DGs) has both original physical states and auxiliary states. Subsequently, adjusting the positive control gains introduced by network dynamics yields the stability of consensus errors in the presence of FDI attacks. On this basis, from the perspective of privacy preservation, the control gains and the locally held masked variables are used to design masked states. Owing to the bounded, time-varying, and non-decaying masked variables, privacy preservation is achieved over the entire running time of an AC CPMG. Finally, the comparative simulation results demonstrate that the proposed protocols achieve attack resilience and privacy preservation, exhibiting a significant advantage in scenarios where all network links are subject to FDI attacks and eavesdropping