Individuation, Adaptability and Cognition in Biological Systems: A Philosophical Modeling

In his doctoral thesis, L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, Simondon formulates three key philosophical claims that we consider crucial. First, in complex physical or biological systems, individuation is not merely a property of an individual, rather, individuality always results from an individuation process. Second, a biological individuated system has a distinctive feature: it acts on its own stage. Third, there must be some non-trivial recursive procedure through which a physical individuated system can switch into a biological one. In this chapter, we propose a philosophical model to further develop this conceptual scheme. This will allow us to characterize biological individuation as a second-order organisation, and to directly connect it with the two concepts of heteronomy and adaptability. We will show that, unlike physical individuation, biological individuation is self-specifying. However it does not do so within a logic of maintenance, as proposed by Francisco Varela, who used a symbolism similar to us. Instead, it follows a logic of heteronomy and adaptability, the logic of life. Varela’s model therefore appears to be a special case within a broader theoretical framework, which is the only way to understand how new constraints/norms/functions can emerge in a biological system, whether at the evolutionary, ontogenetic or behavioural level. Finally, to say that biological individuation is self-specifying is to say that it can be interpreted, and that we cannot understand how a biological system works if we remain fixated on a strictly causal mode of explanation, and on the search for mechanisms, as if it were a watch, a radiator or a computer. We fail to see that, through and by specific biological repair, immune and perceptive devices, it works in a world of signs, in such a way that biological organisation and cognition are always already coupled at the outset. It is only evolution that will gradually uncouple what has been coupled.

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Publication Details

Journal
Yearbook for Philosophy of Complex Systems
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/pcs.2025.14601902
Primary Topic
Philosophy and History of Science
Type
article
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article

Individuation, Adaptability and Cognition in Biological Systems: A Philosophical Modeling

Paul-Antoine Miquel, Alexis Boisseau
Yearbook for Philosophy of Complex Systems
Philosophy and History of Science
article

Individuation, Adaptability and Cognition in Biological Systems: A Philosophical Modeling

Paul-Antoine Miquel, Alexis Boisseau
article en

Abstract

In his doctoral thesis, L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, Simondon formulates three key philosophical claims that we consider crucial. First, in complex physical or biological systems, individuation is not merely a property of an individual, rather, individuality always results from an individuation process. Second, a biological individuated system has a distinctive feature: it acts on its own stage. Third, there must be some non-trivial recursive procedure through which a physical individuated system can switch into a biological one. In this chapter, we propose a philosophical model to further develop this conceptual scheme. This will allow us to characterize biological individuation as a second-order organisation, and to directly connect it with the two concepts of heteronomy and adaptability. We will show that, unlike physical individuation, biological individuation is self-specifying. However it does not do so within a logic of maintenance, as proposed by Francisco Varela, who used a symbolism similar to us. Instead, it follows a logic of heteronomy and adaptability, the logic of life. Varela’s model therefore appears to be a special case within a broader theoretical framework, which is the only way to understand how new constraints/norms/functions can emerge in a biological system, whether at the evolutionary, ontogenetic or behavioural level. Finally, to say that biological individuation is self-specifying is to say that it can be interpreted, and that we cannot understand how a biological system works if we remain fixated on a strictly causal mode of explanation, and on the search for mechanisms, as if it were a watch, a radiator or a computer. We fail to see that, through and by specific biological repair, immune and perceptive devices, it works in a world of signs, in such a way that biological organisation and cognition are always already coupled at the outset. It is only evolution that will gradually uncouple what has been coupled.

Yearbook for Philosophy of Complex SystemsVol. 1(1)
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