Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Generalizable Defense of Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks

Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs).However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks.These attacks aim to circumvent the models' safety guardrails and security mechanisms by introducing jailbreak prompts into malicious queries.In response to these challenges, this paper introduces Defensive Prompt Patch (DPP) 1 , a novel promptbased defense mechanism specifically designed to protect LLMs against such sophisticated jailbreak strategies.Unlike previous approaches, which have often compromised the utility of the model for the sake of safety, DPP is designed to achieve a minimal Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the high utility of LLMs.Our method uses strategically designed suffix prompts that effectively thwart a wide range of standard and adaptive jailbreak techniques.Empirical results conducted on Llama-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 demonstrate the robustness and adaptability of DPP, showing significant reductions in ASR with negligible impact on utility.Our approach not only outperforms existing defense strategies in balancing safety and functionality, but also provides a scalable and robust solution to various LLM platforms.

Authors

Publication Details

Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2025.findings-acl.23
Citations
4
Primary Topic
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
9.92
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article

Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Generalizable Defense of Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks

Xiangyu Qi, Pin‐Yu Chen, Tsung-Yi Ho, Xiong Chen
4 citations
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
9.92
article

Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Generalizable Defense of Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks

Xiangyu Qi, Pin‐Yu Chen, Tsung-Yi Ho, Xiong Chen
article en
4 citations

Abstract

Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs).However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks.These attacks aim to circumvent the models' safety guardrails and security mechanisms by introducing jailbreak prompts into malicious queries.In response to these challenges, this paper introduces Defensive Prompt Patch (DPP) 1 , a novel promptbased defense mechanism specifically designed to protect LLMs against such sophisticated jailbreak strategies.Unlike previous approaches, which have often compromised the utility of the model for the sake of safety, DPP is designed to achieve a minimal Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the high utility of LLMs.Our method uses strategically designed suffix prompts that effectively thwart a wide range of standard and adaptive jailbreak techniques.Empirical results conducted on Llama-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 demonstrate the robustness and adaptability of DPP, showing significant reductions in ASR with negligible impact on utility.Our approach not only outperforms existing defense strategies in balancing safety and functionality, but also provides a scalable and robust solution to various LLM platforms.

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Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
9.92
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Defensive Prompt Patch: A Robust and Generalizable Defense of Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks — Xiangyu Qi, Pin‐Yu Chen, et al. · (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS