Chain-of-Scrutiny: Detecting Backdoor Attacks for Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs), especially those accessed via APIs, have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various domains.However, users without technical expertise often turn to (untrustworthy) third-party services, such as prompt engineering, to enhance their LLM experience, creating vulnerabilities to adversarial threats like backdoor attacks.Backdoor-compromised LLMs generate malicious outputs to users when inputs contain specific "triggers" set by attackers.Traditional defense strategies, originally designed for small-scale models, are impractical for APIaccessible LLMs due to limited model access, high computational costs, and data requirements.To address these limitations, we propose Chain-of-Scrutiny (CoS) which leverages LLMs' unique reasoning abilities to mitigate backdoor attacks.It guides the LLM to generate reasoning steps for a given input and scrutinizes for consistency with the final output -any inconsistencies indicating a potential attack.It is well-suited for the popular API-only LLM deployments, enabling detection at minimal cost and with little data.User-friendly and driven by natural language, it allows non-experts to perform the defense independently while maintaining transparency.We validate the effectiveness of CoS through extensive experiments on various tasks and LLMs, with results showing greater benefits for more powerful LLMs.

Authors

Publication Details

Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2025.findings-acl.401
Citations
4
Primary Topic
Topic Modeling
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
9.92
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Chain-of-Scrutiny: Detecting Backdoor Attacks for Large Language Models

R. S. Mao, Yusen Zhang, Chen Wu, Jiaqi Wang et al.
4 citations
Topic Modeling
9.92
article

Chain-of-Scrutiny: Detecting Backdoor Attacks for Large Language Models

R. S. Mao, Yusen Zhang, Chen Wu, Jiaqi Wang, Renze Lou, Xi Li
article en
4 citations

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs), especially those accessed via APIs, have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various domains.However, users without technical expertise often turn to (untrustworthy) third-party services, such as prompt engineering, to enhance their LLM experience, creating vulnerabilities to adversarial threats like backdoor attacks.Backdoor-compromised LLMs generate malicious outputs to users when inputs contain specific "triggers" set by attackers.Traditional defense strategies, originally designed for small-scale models, are impractical for APIaccessible LLMs due to limited model access, high computational costs, and data requirements.To address these limitations, we propose Chain-of-Scrutiny (CoS) which leverages LLMs' unique reasoning abilities to mitigate backdoor attacks.It guides the LLM to generate reasoning steps for a given input and scrutinizes for consistency with the final output -any inconsistencies indicating a potential attack.It is well-suited for the popular API-only LLM deployments, enabling detection at minimal cost and with little data.User-friendly and driven by natural language, it allows non-experts to perform the defense independently while maintaining transparency.We validate the effectiveness of CoS through extensive experiments on various tasks and LLMs, with results showing greater benefits for more powerful LLMs.

Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Topic Modeling
9.92
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Chain-of-Scrutiny: Detecting Backdoor Attacks for Large Language Models — R. S. Mao, Yusen Zhang, et al. · (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS