A Survey on Model Extraction Attacks and Defenses for Large Language Models

Model extraction attacks pose significant security threats to deployed language models, potentially compromising intellectual property and user privacy. This survey provides a comprehensive taxonomy of LLM-specific extraction attacks and defenses, categorizing attacks into functionality extraction, training data extraction, and prompt-targeted attacks. We analyze various attack methodologies including API-based knowledge distillation, direct querying, parameter recovery, and prompt stealing techniques that exploit transformer architectures. We then examine defense mechanisms organized into model protection, data privacy protection, and prompt-targeted strategies, evaluating their effectiveness across different deployment scenarios. We propose specialized metrics for evaluating both attack effectiveness and defense performance, addressing the specific challenges of generative language models. Through our analysis, we identify critical limitations in current approaches and propose promising research directions, including integrated attack methodologies and adaptive defense mechanisms that balance security with model utility. This work serves NLP researchers, ML engineers, and security professionals seeking to protect language models in production environments.

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Publication Details

Published
2025-08-03
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3711896.3736573
Primary Topic
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Type
article
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article

A Survey on Model Extraction Attacks and Defenses for Large Language Models

Lincan Li, Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Kaize Ding, Yushun Dong et al.
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
article

A Survey on Model Extraction Attacks and Defenses for Large Language Models

Lincan Li, Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Kaize Ding, Yushun Dong, Yue Zhao, Kaixiang Zhao
article en

Abstract

Model extraction attacks pose significant security threats to deployed language models, potentially compromising intellectual property and user privacy. This survey provides a comprehensive taxonomy of LLM-specific extraction attacks and defenses, categorizing attacks into functionality extraction, training data extraction, and prompt-targeted attacks. We analyze various attack methodologies including API-based knowledge distillation, direct querying, parameter recovery, and prompt stealing techniques that exploit transformer architectures. We then examine defense mechanisms organized into model protection, data privacy protection, and prompt-targeted strategies, evaluating their effectiveness across different deployment scenarios. We propose specialized metrics for evaluating both attack effectiveness and defense performance, addressing the specific challenges of generative language models. Through our analysis, we identify critical limitations in current approaches and propose promising research directions, including integrated attack methodologies and adaptive defense mechanisms that balance security with model utility. This work serves NLP researchers, ML engineers, and security professionals seeking to protect language models in production environments.

Florida State University (US), University of Notre Dame (US), Northwestern University (US), University of Southern California (US), Duke University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 90%
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
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A Survey on Model Extraction Attacks and Defenses for Large Language Models — Lincan Li, Neil Zhenqiang Gong, et al. · (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS