Industrialization, class conflict, and the closing window of democratic opportunity

Abstract This paper addresses two long-standing questions in the political economy of development: how the timing of industrialization affects the transition to democracy and how different social classes shape that transition. We develop a sequential game among landed elites, industrialists, and workers embedded in a growth model with endogenous industrialization. The model identifies a window of democratic opportunity during which the industrial class prefers democracy to industrial autocracy. Whether democracy occurs depends on two dimensions of workers’ de facto political power: their power against the landed class determines when industrialization occurs and when landed rule ends; their power against the industrial class determines when the democratic window closes. Later industrialization therefore makes democratization less likely but not impossible. A calibration to Great Britain and numerical exercises for early and late industrializers show that the revolt threat required to sustain democracy rises as industrialization is delayed. Faster technological growth advances political transitions but does not, by itself, determine whether democracy or industrial autocracy follows landed rule.

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Publication Details

Journal
Economic Theory
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-026-01760-x
Primary Topic
Political Theory and Democracy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Industrialization, class conflict, and the closing window of democratic opportunity

Stephen L. Parente
Economic Theory
Political Theory and Democracy
article

Industrialization, class conflict, and the closing window of democratic opportunity

Stephen L. Parente
article en

Abstract

Abstract This paper addresses two long-standing questions in the political economy of development: how the timing of industrialization affects the transition to democracy and how different social classes shape that transition. We develop a sequential game among landed elites, industrialists, and workers embedded in a growth model with endogenous industrialization. The model identifies a window of democratic opportunity during which the industrial class prefers democracy to industrial autocracy. Whether democracy occurs depends on two dimensions of workers’ de facto political power: their power against the landed class determines when industrialization occurs and when landed rule ends; their power against the industrial class determines when the democratic window closes. Later industrialization therefore makes democratization less likely but not impossible. A calibration to Great Britain and numerical exercises for early and late industrializers show that the revolt threat required to sustain democracy rises as industrialization is delayed. Faster technological growth advances political transitions but does not, by itself, determine whether democracy or industrial autocracy follows landed rule.

Economic Theory
Swedish National Bank (SE), University of South Carolina (US), University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US), University of Cagliari (IT)
University of South Carolina, Sveriges Riksbanken, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Decent work and economic growth
Political Theory and Democracy
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