Principled Pragmatism: Big Business and Campaign Contributions After January 6

Abstract Corporations use financial contributions to gain access to influential policymakers. How do these actors respond when officeholders violate widely held norms, such as accepting the results of free and fair elections? We argue that businesses are sensitive to norm violations because they balance their economic interests with accountability demands from employees and other stakeholders. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that legislators who supported Donald Trump’s false claims about a ‘stolen election’ experienced a significant decline in contributions from Fortune 500 PACs in 2021 and 2022. Additionally, our analysis reveals that companies continue to contribute more to party leaders and members of key committees, consistent with our hypothesis. These findings suggest that corporations are willing to balance the interests of their two audiences by sending signals of disapproval towards those who violate established norms while continuing to lobby key lawmakers.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
British Journal of Political Science
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123425000389
Primary Topic
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Principled Pragmatism: Big Business and Campaign Contributions After January 6

Amy D. Meli, Florian Gawehns
British Journal of Political Science
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
article

Principled Pragmatism: Big Business and Campaign Contributions After January 6

Amy D. Meli, Florian Gawehns
article en

Abstract

Abstract Corporations use financial contributions to gain access to influential policymakers. How do these actors respond when officeholders violate widely held norms, such as accepting the results of free and fair elections? We argue that businesses are sensitive to norm violations because they balance their economic interests with accountability demands from employees and other stakeholders. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that legislators who supported Donald Trump’s false claims about a ‘stolen election’ experienced a significant decline in contributions from Fortune 500 PACs in 2021 and 2022. Additionally, our analysis reveals that companies continue to contribute more to party leaders and members of key committees, consistent with our hypothesis. These findings suggest that corporations are willing to balance the interests of their two audiences by sending signals of disapproval towards those who violate established norms while continuing to lobby key lawmakers.

British Journal of Political ScienceVol. 55
University of Virginia (US), University of Maryland, College Park (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 72%
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Principled Pragmatism: Big Business and Campaign Contributions After January 6 — Amy D. Meli, Florian Gawehns · British Journal of Political Science (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS