Research on the Evolutionary Game Simulation of Low-carbon Logistics Decision in Supply Chain Enterprises under Dynamic Environmental Regulation

In order to achieve China's "dual carbon" goals as soon as possible and solve the problem of high carbon emissions in logistics and transportation, this paper constructs a low-carbon logistics decision-making evolutionary game model between suppliers and manufacturers. Based on dynamic environmental regulatory measures, the evolution process and stability of low-carbon logistics decisions are analyzed, and the impact of initial intention, government subsidies, and logistics restrictions on low-carbon logistics decisions has been simulated by Matlab R2016a. The results show that both suppliers and manufacturers are not in a low willingness state when adopting low-carbon logistics;the level of government subsidies will have a significant positive impact on the evolutionary and it will accelerate the speed of reaching the equilibrium point;the level of logistics restrictions will have a significant negative impact on the evolutionary and it will hinder reaching the ideal equilibrium point. Finally, corresponding policy measures are provided for implementation.