Game Analysis of the Regulatory Evolution of Inventory Pledge Financing Based on Prospect Theory

In order to investigate the regulation of inventory pledge financing, based on prospect theory, a dynamic evolution game model of "SMEs - third-party logistics enterprises - financial institutions" is constructed, the strategy selection and decision-making mechanism of each participant in inventory pledge financing are analyzed in depth, and numerical simulation are carried out by using Matlab software, which reveals the influence of factors such as reward and punishment strength, reputation gain, loss avoidance coefficient and risk preference coefficient on the regulation of inventory pledge financing. The results show that: the rewards and punishments of financial institutions are the key factors affecting the decision-making of enterprises; the reputation evaluation can promote enterprises to choose positive strategies; the loss aversion coefficient and the risk preference coefficient of the perceived value function have a significant effect on the strategy choice of the game parties, and increasing the perceived value of the loss of the game parties is the key to realize the equilibrium.