Fee-For-Service, Accountable Care Organizations, And Medicare Advantage: Why?

This Perspective discusses the fiscal challenge facing Medicare and how that challenge may be differentially met by fee-for-service, accountable care organization (ACO), and Medicare Advantage (MA) payment systems. The non-MA part of Medicare includes both fee-for-service and ACO payment systems and is sometimes referred to as traditional Medicare. Fee-for-service, although in need of reform, is inherently ill suited to improving the efficiency of care delivery. MA and ACOs offer more promise, but design issues related to MA payment policy and ACO program features have limited their ability to reduce program spending. In the case of MA, which is paid more by Medicare than would be spent if beneficiaries were in traditional Medicare, the core questions are how much value is created by the added benefits that higher payment helps finance, and what would be lost If MA payment were changed. In the case of ACOs, the key question is how program design can build on the demonstrated ability of some ACO models to provide care more efficiently and save money.

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Publication Details

Journal
Health Affairs
Published
2025-07-30
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2025.00713
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Healthcare Policy and Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.13
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article

Fee-For-Service, Accountable Care Organizations, And Medicare Advantage: Why?

Michael E. Chernew
1 citations
Health Affairs
Healthcare Policy and Management
3.13
article

Fee-For-Service, Accountable Care Organizations, And Medicare Advantage: Why?

Michael E. Chernew
article en
1 citations

Abstract

This Perspective discusses the fiscal challenge facing Medicare and how that challenge may be differentially met by fee-for-service, accountable care organization (ACO), and Medicare Advantage (MA) payment systems. The non-MA part of Medicare includes both fee-for-service and ACO payment systems and is sometimes referred to as traditional Medicare. Fee-for-service, although in need of reform, is inherently ill suited to improving the efficiency of care delivery. MA and ACOs offer more promise, but design issues related to MA payment policy and ACO program features have limited their ability to reduce program spending. In the case of MA, which is paid more by Medicare than would be spent if beneficiaries were in traditional Medicare, the core questions are how much value is created by the added benefits that higher payment helps finance, and what would be lost If MA payment were changed. In the case of ACOs, the key question is how program design can build on the demonstrated ability of some ACO models to provide care more efficiently and save money.

Health AffairsVol. 44(8)
Harvard University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 7%
Healthcare Policy and Management
3.13
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Fee-For-Service, Accountable Care Organizations, And Medicare Advantage: Why? — Michael E. Chernew · Health Affairs (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS