Crisis and “Institutional Hubbing” in the European Union

ABSTRACT This study asks how crisis affects institutional designs and offers a study of crisis coordination mechanisms in the European Union (EU). Studies have suggested that crisis tends to strengthen the role of the member states in the EU. New intergovernmentalist literature in particular suggests that member states take a leading role in dealing with crises through consensus‐seeking deliberation in search for common solutions. Our study challenges this argument by identifying how crises lead to a de facto strengthening of the executive authority of the Commission by “hubbing” meso‐level hybrid coordination mechanisms. The article sides with institutionalist literature arguing that the rise of new coordination instruments in the EU enables the Commission to leverage its executive power. The data demonstrate an extensive growth of hybrid coordination mechanisms which has increased the agenda setting, coordinating, and implementing role of the Commission, which is conducive to crisis‐induced strengthening of executive power of the Commission.