The Banality of Evil

In this paper, I analyse and evaluate Hannah Arendt’s concept of the banality of evil as applied to Adolf Eichmann to determine whether critical readings of Arendt’s application are warranted. Modern conceptions of evil, including Arendt’s, are important for helping us understand and explain the most immoral acts that defy labels like “bad” or “wrong.” A close reading of Arendt’s report, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, reveals the value of her contribution in advancing our understanding of evil, as she describes a new kind of criminal and crime. I argue that atrocities can result from mere thoughtlessness, an absence of reflective judgement, while still grounding moral responsibility, by analysing Arendt’s treatment of “radical” evil, differing senses of intention, and notions of responsibility. Situating Arendt within her historical and intellectual context, and clarifying key misinterpretations of her work, the paper provides a distinct moral-philosophical interpretation of the banality of evil.