Research on the interest balance and pricing mechanism of standard essential patent holders considering fair preference

Studying the transition from conflict of interests to coordination of interests between patent holders and patent implementers in the standard essential patent system is crucial for effectively resolving the conflict of interests between the two parties during the development of standard essential patents, and it is the necessary path for accelerating the promotion of standard implementation. Based on the FRAND principle of standard essential patents, considering fairness preference, this study investigates the interest equilibrium and pricing mechanism of standard essential patent implementation entities. Using differential game theory, a profit model for the standard essential patent system is constructed, considering fully rational centralized decision-making, fully rational decentralized decision-making, and fairness-preference decentralized decision-making, and the stable equilibrium is solved. Secondly, the Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to coordinate and improve the licensing pricing of standard essential patents. The research findings are as follows: 1) Fairness preference can effectively inhibit the hold-up behavior of patent holders during the implementation of standard essential patents; 2) The fairness preference coefficient also promotes reverse hold-up by standard essential patent implementers to a certain extent; 3) A reasonable interest allocation and coordination mechanism is conducive to achieving pricing correction and profit improvement for standard essential patent entities.