Challenges and Responses of the South Korean Parliament to the Presidential Coup

On December 3, 2024, at 10:27 pm, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol abruptly declared emergency martial law across the country, claiming that the opposition-led National Assembly was attempting to subvert the liberal democratic system by exerting undue pressures on government and, therefore, martial law was inevitable to crack down anti-state forces behind opposition groups, seemingly colluding with North Korea, and thereby restore national stability. Simultaneously, martial law forces burst into the National Assembly and the National Election Commission. His declaration of martial law shook and frustrated Korean people for several reasons, differently from President Yoon’s ostensible intentions. First, it was out of the blue since South Korea was not in a war or wartime-like situation, which is an exceptional condition that justifies the use of martial law according to the Korean Constitution. Instead, President Yoon referred to the current political gridlock between the government and the opposition-majority National Assembly as a national emergency to justify his abuse of martial law power. In April 2024 the 22nd National Assembly with its 300 members had been elected with 175 seats for the first opposition Democratic Party, the largest party, 108 seats for the ruling People Power Party, and the remaining 17 seats for various other parties. Second, although some lawmakers had already suspected and warned that Yoon was prepared to declare martial law, it was deemed too anachronistic to warrant serious attention. Yet, in fact, Yoon appointed people personally close to him to military leadership positions, refused to attend the opening ceremony of the new National Assembly in September 2024, signaling his disregard for feasible cooperation with the opposition, and, in October, the government even held a huge military parade in the city center to celebrate Armed Forces Day, demonstrating the President’s command-in-chief position outwardly. Lastly, such an unconstitutional imposition of martial law gave the people a sense of déjà vu from historical experience, which led to a great frustration that 40 years of democratic achievements would be reversed and the country might regress to the dictatorial past. In short, it was evident that President Yoon abused martial law power without valid reasons or legitimate circumstances, mobilizing troops to eliminate political opponents. It therefore can be described as a presidential self-coup, which is defined as when the incumbent executive leader takes illegal actions against the people or institutions to extend or expand his power. It was a self-coup using the past dictators’ reference. Such a direct attack on the constitutional order by the head of the executive branch constitutes one of the most threatening constitutional crises in the presidential system. However, this exceptional situation, which not only put South Korea’s democracy to the test but also could have set back its decades-old democracy, was swiftly responded to by the parliament, which remained a core pillar of the constitutional structure, and was being resolved through the legal institutional framework.