Evolutionary game analysis on phishing scams using attacker and defender model

Purpose This study aims to model and analyze the strategic interactions between phishing call center scammers and authorities using game theory. By identifying equilibrium stability conditions, it provides insights into optimizing cybersecurity defense strategies. Design/methodology/approach A game-theoretic model was developed to represent the attacker (phishing call center scammers) – defender (authorities) interactions. The model incorporated key parameters such as costs, rewards, penalties and success rates. The stability, primarily focusing on four pure strategy equilibrium points, was analyzed using the trace-determinant method, deriving inequalities from the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix. Stability conditions were examined under both general and specific assumptions to reflect realistic cybersecurity scenarios. Findings This study identified scenarios where individual-target defense is more effective against low-cost attacks, while investing in overarching defense is preferable for countering high-cost attacks. The stability analysis revealed key factors influencing long-term strategic balance between attackers and defenders, including costs, arrest and defense rates and successful attack rates. Originality/value This research provides a game-theoretic approach to analyze phishing scams by integrating stability analysis using the trace-determinant method. By considering the equilibrium conditions and their stability, it provides deeper insights into the long-term effectiveness of defense strategies. The findings offer practical implications for cybersecurity policymakers, enhancing their understanding of attacker-defender dynamics. As this work focuses on pure strategy equilibria, future research could explore mixed strategies, dynamic behaviors over time and cooperative defense mechanisms.