Observer-Based Resilient Adaptive Event-Triggered Control for Islanded Microgrids Under DoSAs and Unknown FDI Attacks

This study investigates the resilient event-triggered load frequency control (LFC) issue of islanded microgrids (MGs) subject to denial of service attacks (DoSAs) and unknown false data injection attacks (FDIAs) simultaneously. An augmented extended observer is established to estimate both unavailable system states and unknown FDIA signals. A resilient adaptive event-triggered (AET) scheme, incorporating DoSA detection, FDIA estimation, and dynamic threshold adjustment, is proposed to reduce network resource consumption while countering cyberattacks. Some sufficient criteria are derived to ensure the asymptotic stability of the augmented estimation error system with <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">H</i><sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">∞</sub> performance. Additionally, the uniformly ultimate boundedness of the system is also guaranteed even under hybrid cyberattacks. Finally, simulation studies are used to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.