The Problem of Simulated Evil

According to the simulation hypothesis, the world we live in is a computer simulation. According to long-termism, we should aim to bring about the best possible future. In this paper, I argue that there is a tension between the two: in so far as we have reason to think we are living in a computer simulation, we have reason to think the long-termist project will fail (or has already failed). I make my case by developing a novel version of the problem of evil. It says that there exist certain forms of evil in our world that longtermist philosophers have argued we should try to eradicate. But then, the existence of those evils gives us reason to think our world is not a computer simulation run by a being aligned with longtermist values. In short, the more that longtermists think we could make the world a better place in the future, the more troubling they should find it that the world is not already a better place, given the assumption that we are living in a computer simulation.