Rethinking Power-Sharing: The Limits of Consociationalism in the Face of Secessionist Elites

Power-sharing has emerged as a prevalent approach in post-conflict state-building efforts in divided societies. Arend Lijphart, who introduced the concept of consociational democracy as a form of power-sharing, argues that it offers the most viable path to achieving peace and stable democracy in deeply divided societies. He suggests that consociational democracy ensures representation for all groups, provides elite cooperation, and provides mechanisms like proportional representation and veto power to maintain stability and peace. However, this study critically examines the assumptions of the power-sharing model regarding elite cooperation. The power-sharing model assumes elites will be content with the gains from sharing power and act cooperatively, but it doesn't account for how secessionist leaders might exploit these arrangements to advance their agendas. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the post-war political settlement is predicated on power-sharing arrangements. However, the gains of the Dayton system proved ineffective in mitigating the secessionist tendencies of the Bosnian Serb elites. Despite the power-sharing arrangements, the Republika Srpska administration led by Milorad Dodik continues to push for independence. Findings from an in-depth analysis of Bosnia show that the power-sharing approach needs to be refined in line with empirical evidence on the attitudes and policies of secessionist elites.